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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOCTRINE
OF ABSTENTION
HE doctrine of abstention is a "judge-fashioned vehicle"' of
equitable origin 2 whereby a federal court, motivated by principles
of comity or by a desire to avoid premature constitutional adjudica-
tion,8 declines to proceed in a case over which it has jurisdiction
and remits all or part of the controversy to a state court. In the
interests of comity federal courts have been directed not to interfere
with state criminal prosecutions,4 collection of state revenues0 and,
in certain instances, actions of state administrative agencies0 and
officials." The desire to avoid premature8 and perhaps unnecessary
constitutional adjudication has prompted federal courts to abstain
when federal constitutional issues might be rendered moot 9 by a
state court's determination of uncertain state law.' 0 This comment
'England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
2 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). The Court has held that abstention is equally appropriate
in actions traditionally at law. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25 (1959) (eminent domain).
'E.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962); Harri-
son v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176-78 (1959); Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953);
Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 459-62, 470-71 (1945); City
of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168, 172-73 (1942).
E.g., Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1940).
5E.g., Great Lakes Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
:E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
'E.g., Alabama Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
8A federal determination that a state law is unconstitutional if applied to a
certain set of facts, or if construed in a certain way is but a tentative "forecast" which
might be rendered moot by a subsequent state court decision. Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.).
I Abstention has never been invoked to avoid a potentially premature adjudication
of non-organic (i.e., non-constitutional) federal law. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S.
472 (1949).
"See Liverpool, N.Y. & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 118
U.S. 33, 39 (1885). The most famous exposition of the doctrine is found in Mr. Justice
Brandeis' concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347-48 (1936).
Mr. Justice Black has challenged categorical obedience to the doctrine: "I believe
that there are times when a constitutional question is so important that it should
be decided even though judicial ingenuity would find a way to escape it." Clay v.
Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 214 (1960) (dissent).
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Mc-
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focuses upon recent developments in the abstention doctrine in both
diversity and federal question cases. 1
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP CASES
Traditionally, abstention has been hailed as a narrow exception
to the duty incumbent upon federal courts to accept and adjudicate
cases falling within jurisdictional categories established by Con-
gress.' 2 Diversity cases are those where district courts have original
jurisdiction to hear and decide civil actions, where the matter in
controversy exceeds ten thousand dollars, between citizens of differ-
ent states or between citizens of a state and a foreign state.' 3 Two
decades ago the Supreme Court in Meredith, v. City of Winter
Havenx4 stated that:
[l]n the absence of some recognized public policy or defined
principle guiding the exercise of . . . [diversity] jurisdiction . . .
which would in exceptional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has
been from the first deemed to be the duty of the federal courts,
if their jurisdiction is properly invoked, to decide questions of
state law whenever necessary to the rendition of judgment ...
When such exceptional circumstances are not present, denial of
that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the answers
to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not
yet been given by the highest court of the state, would thwart
the purpose of the jurisdictional act.15
Under this standard, the existence of uncertain state law was a
ground for abstention only if such action were required by principles
Laughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) referred to the doctrine of avoidance as "more deeply
rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication." Id. at 105. See
Cardozo, Choosing and Declaring State Law: Deference to State Courts Versus Federal
Responsibility, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 419, 423 (1960).
1128 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1958).
112bid. The original justification for the creation of diversity jurisdiction in §
1332 seems to have been that "the availability of a federal forum away from home
for litigation with strangers served to provide a guarantee of efficient, competent and
disinterested justice which, by its reassurance to one considering movement or busi-
ness in another State, contributed to the expansion of trade and intercourse through-
out the nation." ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS at 51 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964).
1"28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
14 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Meredith was a diversity action in which plaintiffs sought
to enjoin the city from redeeming certain bonds without the payment of deferred
interest charges. The controversy hinged upon whether the city was authorized under
the Florida constitution and applicable statutes to issue the bonds without a refer-
endum, and what recovery, if any, the bondholders were entitled to receive if the
bonds were invalidly issued.
11!d. at 234-35. (Emphasis added.)
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of comity or would enable a federal court to avoid determination
of a constitutional question. The bases for refusing to exercise juris-
diction, however, was extended by a 1959 decision of the United
States Supreme Court.16 This and subsequent lower court opinions
have cast considerable doubt upon the continuing vitality of the poli-
cy enunciated in Meredith.
The "Sovereign Prerogative" Theory
In Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,'7 the
plaintiff commenced an action in the Louisiana state courts to ex-
propriate property pursuant to its power of eminent domain. The
case was then removed by the defendant to a federal district court
where jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship. Al-
though a Louisiana statute apparently granted the expropriation
power sought by the city, the statute had never been interpreted by
the Louisiana courts, and in a similar case, the state's attorney gen-
eral had concluded that the statute did not grant such power. The
district court abstained, sua sponte, and remitted the controversy to
the state courts. In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court
sustained the district court's abstention as a proper exercise of dis-
cretion even though no substantial constitutional questions were
presented"' and ordinary principles of comity were apparently in-
applicable.
The majority in Thibodaux held that abstention Was justified
in the triar court's discretion 9 because the eminent domain question
was "intimately involved with the sovereign prerogative." 20 Since
"the issues normally turn on legislation with much local variation
26 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
17360 U.S. 25 (1959).
"'The majority avoided mention of the alleged constitutional questions presented.
The dissenters argued that merely frivolous constitutional questions would not justify
abstention on the ground of avoidance. Id. at 33.
2' In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959), decided
upon the same day as Thibodaux, the Court affirmed 5-4 the Third Circuit's reversal
of a district court abstention and dismissal order. In Mashuda plaintiff sought the
ouster of the county and its lessee from certain lands previously taken from the
plaintiff in eminent domain proceedings. The sole question presented was whether
the land had been taken for a public purpose as required by Pennsylvania law. The
Court held abstention inappropriate since state law was "clear," and no questions
of avoidance or comity were presented.
The Justices in the majority in Thibodaux dissented in Mashuda, with the ex-
ception of Mr. Justice Stewart who joined the former dissenters. Stewart professed
to distinguish the two cases on the ground that Mashuda presented a question of
disputed fact, which a federal court could dispose of as competently as a state court.
20 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
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interpreted in local settings,"2' the federal courts should have de-
ferred to the state tribunals "in a matter close to the political inter-
ests of a State"2 2 in order to promote "harmonious federal-state
relations. ' 23 Furthermore, the exercise of federal jurisdiction was
not abdicated but merely "postponed," as the district court was to
retain jurisdiction and the litigation might return there following a
declaratory judgment of the state law by the Louisiana court.2 4
Mr. Justice Brennan, vigorously dissenting, was unable to dis-
cern a correlation between eminent domain and the sovereign pre-
rogative so compelling as to distinguish expropriation proceedings
from many other state functions.25 He asserted that the majority
rationale was a subterfuge designed to disguise a desire to avoid de-
termination of difficult state law questions and a distaste for the con-
gressional mandate to exercise diversity jurisdiction.26 The Justice
warned that the majority was fashioning "an opening wedge for Dis-
trict Courts to refer hard cases of state law to state courts in even the
routine diversity negligence and contract actions."-27 Wholesale in-
vocation of abstention in such cases, he warned, would result in
"unnecessary delay, waste, and added expense for the parties."28 In
two recent cases decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,29
these fears have been realized.
The "Effective State Remedy" Qualification
In Green v. American Tobacco Co.,30 a decedent's widow and
estate brought a diversity action to recover damages for his death
from lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking cigarettes manufac-
tured by the defendant. The court of appeals affirmed judgment
for the defendant, holding that in the absence of negligence, a manu-
21 Ibid.
2Id. at 29.
2a Ibid.
" Ibid.
2 Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that the federal courts had previously refused
to abstain on matters of uncertain state law involving the licensing of motor vehicles,
the regulation of fishing in state waters, the regulation of intrastate trucking rates
and "a host of other governmental activities carried on by the States and their sub-
divisions." Id. at 37.
21 Id. at 39.42.
27 Id. at 44.
28 Id. at 42.
" United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 935 (1964); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
upon subsequent proceedings, 325 F.2d 673, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
11 Supra note 29.
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facturer could not be liable under Florida law as an absolute
insurer of its product. On rehearing, however, the court certified
the question3' of absolute liability for breach of implied warranty 2
to the Florida Supreme Court under a novel statutory provision.33
Without discussing the propriety of certification solely on the basis
of the uncertainty of state law,3 4 the Fifth Circuit stressed the im-
portance of the question and the inability of the federal judges to
agree on the position which Florida courts would adopt.33
By themselves, Thibodaux and Green might have been viewed
merely as narrow exceptions to the general rule that federal courts
will not abstain unless prompted by principles of comity or the
presence of a federal constitutional question.30 Thibodaux might
31 The parties were directed, if possible, to stipulate the questions to be certified.
In the -event that the parties could not agree upon stipulation, the court ordered
them to file a report, accompanied by relevant briefs. 304 F.2d at 86.
32 The Supreme Court of Florida replied to the certification in Green v. American
Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (1962). Contrary to the original federal determination,
the state court found that "a manufacturer's or seller's actual knowledge or oppor.
tunity for knowledge of a defective or unwholesome condition is wholly irrelevant
to his liability on the theory of implied warranty." 154 So. 2d at 170. Upon subse.
quent proceedings, the court of appeals remanded the case to the federal district
court for a new trial upon the specific question of whether defendant's cigarettes
were reasonably fit for human consumption. However, the parties were bound by
the answers to other specific interrogatories submitted to the jury in the first trial.
Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673, 678 (5th Cir. 1963).
s FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031, implemented by FLA. APP. R. 4.61. The Florida
certification statute permits courts of appeal and the Supreme Court to certify ques.
tions of Florida law to the state supreme court. The provision was first utilized in
Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1963). See 5 AM. JuR. 2o Appeal and Error
§§ 1025-28 (1962); BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-RULES
EDITON § 64 (Wright ed. 1960); Kaplan, Certification of Questions from Federal
Appellate Courts to the Florida Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Abstention
Doctrine, 16 U. MAMI L. REv. 413, 431 (1962). Certification is frequently attacked
upon the grounds that questions certified are "abstract" or "academic" and will not in-
sure a meaningful rendition of state law. See, e.g., 21 LA. L. REv. 777, 780-82 (1961).
"The Supreme Court has upon its own motion ordered certification to the Florida
Supreme Court in two recent cases: Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 156
(1963); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1963). In both cases, however, substantial
constitutional questions were presented.
"5 Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 86 (5th Cir. 1962).
"A few other cases may be regarded as signifying erosion of Meredith. In A.F.L.
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Wis. 1960), plaintiff
sought to enjoin cancellation of his dealer's franchise as an alleged violation of a
Wisconsin statute. Plaintiff was granted a temporary restraining order in the state
courts, but the defendant removed. The federal court dissolved the restraining order
and abstained. No questions of comity or avoidance were presented, but relevant
state law was unclear. The case might be viewed as falling within the sovereign
prerogative exception of Thibodaux. See Comment, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 450, 456.
However, Professor Wright contends that the only basis for abstention was the un-
certainty of state law. WIGHr, FEDERAL CoUTS § 52, at 175, n.42 (1963).
An even stronger case is Commerce Oil Ref. Corp. v. Miner, 303 F.2d 125 (1st
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have been confined to the somewhat vague theory of "sovereign pre-
rogative," whereas Green could have been restricted to the presence
of an unusually expeditious and effective state court remedy. Both of
these cases, moreover, accord with precedent which requires the
existence of an adequate state court remedy as a prerequisite to
abstention. 37
A New Application of Erie
United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney,38 however, represents a
direct assault upon the Meredith policy that federal courts must de-
cide state law in the absence of some compelling reason of policy or
defined principle. The Delaney case involved separate actions on
life insurance policies, with the defendant insurers claiming non-
liability under certain aircraft travel provisions. 39 Two district
courts held the insurers liable and appeals were taken. By a five to
Cir. 1962). That case involved the question of whether a two year Rhode Island
statute of limitations for personal injury actions applied to a suit for malicious use
of process, a question that had not previously been considered by the state courts.
During the course of the controversy in the federal district court, the defendant
brought a declaratory judgment proceeding in a Rhode Island state court and moved
for the federal court to stay its proceedings. Instead, at plaintiff's request, the dis-
trict court enjoined the state proceedings. The court of appeals vacated the injunc-
tion, stating: "No one could seriously suggest that an 'informed prophecy' as to the
meaning of a state statute is to be preferred to an 'authoritative decision,' let alone
that the former is to be protected from the latter." 303 F.2d at 128.
The court limited its holding to instances where "facts are undisputed" and
indicated that where the parties and issues are substantially identical in the state
court proceedings, it is proper for a district court in its discretion to stay its proceed-
ings pending the forthcoming state determination. Accord, Lear Siegler Inc. v. Adkins,
330 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1964); Ballantine Books, Inc. v. Capital Distributing Co.,
302 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1962); P. Beiersdorf & Co. v. McGohey, 187 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1951) (by implication); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949). But see
In re Pres. &- Fellows of Harvard College, 149 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1945). Thus, the forth-
coming state court adjudication would be controlling according to res judicata
principles. 303 F.2d at 128. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
A much earlier case allowing abstention on the basis of uncertain state law is
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940), in which a trustee in
federal bankruptcy proceedings was permitted to enter the state courts to secure an
adjudication of an uncertain state law question.
"'See Lucas v. 44th General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 716 n.2 (1964); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co.. 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1940); DiGiovanni v. Camden Ins. Ann.,
296 U.S. 64, 73 (1935); Lee v. Bickell, 292 U.S. 415 (1933); Embassy Pictures Corp. v.
Hudson, 226 F. Supp. 421, 426 (W.D. Tenn. 1964). See also England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 423 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
But cf. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Meridian, 358 U.S. 639 (1959).
" 328 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 935 (1964).
89 Delaney v. United Services Life Ins. Co., 201 F. Supp. 25 (W.D. Tex. 1961). The
companion case, Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank (N.D. Tex.), was un-
reported.
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four majority0 the Fifth Circuit held per curiam that Texas law left
the meaning of the disputed clauses obscure and stayed decision
pending clarification by the Texas courts. 4'
In a conc.urring opinion42 Judge Brown defended the invocation
of abstention on the sole ground that the applicable state law was
uncertain. Without attempting to fit Delaney into the area of "sover-
eign prerogative," he explicitly rejected the notion that abstention
was proper only in the presence of an "unusually effective state
remedy" such as the certification statute utilized in Green.48 Judge
Brown contended that abstention in ordinary diversity cases reflects
no antagonism to diversity jurisdiction, but simply evinces respect
for the requirements of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins44 and the outcome-
determination test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 4r The theory of
these decisions is that substantially different results should not ensue
simply because an action is filed in "a federal court instead of in a
State court a block away."' 46 Citing the Fifth Circuit's recent experi-
ence, Judge Brown stressed the likelihood of decisional disparity
where a federal court is compelled to conjecture as to uncertain
state law. He noted that when Meredith was decided in 1943 this
problem was just beginning to emerge a1
To argue that abstention is required by the dictates of Erie in
those cases where federal courts are faced with uncertain questions
of state law is to propose a novel limitation upon the exercise of
diversity jurisdiction.48 Although the majority of the Fifth Circuit
ordered abstention in Delaney, only Judge Brown articulated this
rationale. The result, however, is not surprising in view of the fre-
"o The court sat en banc, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1958).
" The majority opinion was entered per curiam. 328 F.2d at 483-85. The dissent
rested squarely on the authority of Meredith that the congressional mandate to decide
diversity cases required the court to decide the uncertain state law questions. Id. at 485.
,2 Id. at 485-89.
Is It has been suggested that the dissenters in Delaney might have been willing
to abstain had a certification procedure been available. Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 856
(1964). But see note 41 supra.
"304 U.S. 64 (1938).
,326 U.S. 99 (1945).
"Id. at 109.
"328 F.2d at 486.
,Before Thibodaux, the congressional mandate to decide diversity cases was deemed
to outweigh the advantages of uniformity and certainty incumbent upon remission.
See, e.g., Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402, 410 (1952); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472,
490-91 (1949); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 558 (1946); Markham
v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,
237 (1943). See also McNeese v. Board of Educ. 373 U.S. 668, 673 n.5 (1963) (dictum).
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quent decisional disparity between state courts and the Fifth Cir-
cuit.' Such disparity is often explained in terms of the expertise in
state law possessed by local judges.50 Moreover, federal judges may
be excessively conservative when confronted with sensitive policy
questions of local concern; 51 they may tend to rely too heavily upon
only dimly analogous or outworn state precedent instead of inquir-
ing into "what reasonably ought to be the state court's interpreta-
tion, given this body of law."52 The existence of this propensity, as
well as the superior expertise of state courts in matters of state law,
tends to support Judge Brown's application of Erie.52a
Support may also be claimed in the debatable assertion that the
Erie rationale is required by the federal constitution, and does not
represent merely a policy decision to apply state law in lieu of a
federal common law.53 If this assertion is correct, the congressional
mandate to decide diversity cases would arguably yield when federal
courts are faced with the risk of erroneous interpretation of state
law. Although the Supreme Court has never expressly decided
whether the Erie formula is a constitutional mandate, at least one
decision of that Court has held that "affirmative countervailing con-
,Compare New York Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 196.1), with
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1963). Compare National Sur. Corp. v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936
(5th Cir. 1957), with Truck Ins. Exch. v. Seelbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521 (1960).
Compare Pogue v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957), with Food
Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961).
1o E.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (Frank-
furter, J.).
r See American Universal Ins. Co. v. Chauvin, 329 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1964);
Colbrese v. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 978 (D. Mont.
1964).
52 Recognition of the existence of this problem may be inferred from language in
American Universal Ins. Co. v. Chauvin, supra note 51, where the court declared
itself bound under Erie to a 1951 state court precedent of questionable modem
stature. "The Insurer recognizes that it has the laboring oar in demonstrating a
shift in the currents by some recognizable, objectively legal-hydrographic data
transcending a mere psychoanalysis of Louisiana Courts in terms of personal changes
or developments in socio-legal outlook.... This argument, somewhat involved, and
approaching juridical psychoanalysis, rests finally on an assertion that the judicial
'climate' or 'atmosphere' has changed since DeRoode." Id. at 177-78.
52* Note, 73 YALa L.J. 850 (1964) suggests that a deleterious effect of a disparate
federal decision may be its impact upon "legitimate private ordering." Parties may
misplace their reliance upon the federal decision as an accurate expression of state
law. Nevertheless, counsel should be presumed to appreciate the stature of the federal
determination. Id. at 863-64.
53 Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 437-38
(1958); see Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLuM. L. Rv.
489, 509-10 (1954).
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siderations,"5 4 such as federal policies favoring jury trials, supersede
the Erie requirement of decisional uniformity.r5 Likewise, it might
be argued that the necessity of avoiding added expense 0 and ap-
preciable delay,57 when attendant upon remission of a case to the
state courts, justifies deciding a diversity case whenever abstention
can be avoided.
Moreover, the majority of commentators have asserted that Erie
is not constitutionally required, but merely reflects an expression of
policy governing the disposition of cases in federal courts. 8 In this
context, it is relatively easy to discover countervailing considerations
mitigating against the invocation of abstention purely for purposes
of deciding uncertain state law. Aside from the additional expense
involved, in some cases there is the danger that further delay will
irreparably injure certain litigants, particularly those who bear bur-
dens of proof. Futhermore, Judge Brown's opinion fails to appre-
ciate the difficulty in determining exactly when federal courts are
faced with "uncertain state law."59 Established precedent may be
subject to change or modification merely by lapse of time or presen-
tation of a new factual situation. Erie logic, if carried to extremes,
54Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958). The decision
is not dispositive of the question whether Erie is a Constitutional decision because
the state rule was "not bound up with rights and obligations" of the parties. Never-
theless, it is significant that the Court continually referred to the Erie requirement
of uniformity as a policy. Ibid. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) also
lends support to the theory that Erie is not Constitutionally required: "Erie ... was not
an endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that
touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal
courts." Id. at 109.
" 356 U.S. at 537-39. The Court did not base its decision on the ground that jury
trial was required by the Constitution. Id. at 537 n.10.
5' See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
57 Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964) argues that the involved litigants may not be pri-
marily concerned with eventual disparities between federal and state courts on matters
of state law. "[L]itigants do have the right to an impartial, uniform and prompt
decision by judges doing their best, not their worst. And they receive that exactly
when non-abstaining federal judges decide their claims. The litigants have had their
'day in court' and their claims are resolved. Such a decision in the present may be
more highly valued than some 'more perfect' decision in the future." Id. at 863.
(Emphasis added.)
5' Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278-79 (1946); Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict
of Laws, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 405, 468-69 (1955); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The
Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 188-204
(1957); see notes 48 & 54 supra.
"Judge Brown did suggest the need for limits on the doctrine "lest each and
every diversity case on its initial filing be immediately turned out to graze in the
state pasture." 328 F.2d at 488.
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could result in a total abdication of diversity jurisdiction.60 Were
uniformity of result the categorical imperative,60° federal courts
0 0 The federal obligation to adjudicate diversity cases is conferred by statute. 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1958); see Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 858-61 (1964). The justifications
advanced for diversity jurisdiction today are: (I) the existence of bias in various
regions of the country against persons from other regions-more dramatically re-
flected in state than federal proceedings; (2) localization of place of trial by state
venue provisions and subsequent "machinations [against outsiders] of the 'local court
house gang' "; (3) inadequacies in state court procedures; (4) congestion in the state
courts in great metropolitan areas; (5) the avoidance of friction between the citizens
of the several states that might be caused by state litigation favorable to the in-
stater; (6) the need to provide the best possible forums for aliens to satisfy the
demands of world opinion. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS at 52-56 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964).
Illustrative of the potentially expanionist drift of Delaney is a subsequent Fifth
Circuit case, St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Price, 329 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964). The
district court in St. Paul awarded summary judgment of the benefits of certain life
insurance policies to representatives of the insured. Insured had been killed, along
with a companion, during a business trip when the airplane in which they were
flying crashed. The insurer refused to make payment and asserted the following
provision of the policy as a defense: "The insurance under this policy shall not
cover loss directly or indirectly caused or contributed to by: . . . riding in or on any
aircraft being used for any purpose such as crop dusting, seeding, sky-riding, racing,
testing, exploration, or any other purpose except the sole purpose of transportation,
or while the insured is operating, learning to operate or serving as a member of a
crew of'an aircraft." Id. at 687. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs disputed the insurer's
contention that the insured was a member of the crew. The district court concluded
that the contract was ambiguous, and that according to state law ambiguities should
be resolved in the favor of the insured.
The court of appeals reversed and abstained, arguing that whether the contract
was ambiguous was a matter of state law. Since the consolidated cases in Delaney
also involved airplane travel exclusions in life insurance policies, St. Paul might be
viewed as controlled by those cases which were still pending before the state courts.
The court, however, indicated that the case would have justified abstention in its
own right: See id. at 689.
The pressure of increased workloads upon federal courts in general and the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in particular may have been an underlying stimulus for
the position taken in Delaney. See Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in
Judicial Administration, 42 TExAs L. REv. 949 (1964), and accompanying note, 42
TLxAs L. REv. 1049 (1964). Diversity jurisdiction has recently been the object of pro-
posals that would effect a reduction in the number of diversity actions brought in
the federal courts. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent- Draft No. 2, 1964), which concludes that while "diversity
jurisdiction continues to serve an important function in our federal system . .. it
presently extends to substantial classes of cases which have no valid justification for
being in the national courts ..... Id. at 1-2.
OOa One case in which obeisance to Erie is reflected is Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hallatt,
326 F.2d 275 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 932 (1964). There plaintiff was awarded
a judgment against the defendant insurance company in the lower federal court. The
court of appeals found error in the first trial and remanded the case. On retrial the
jury found for the defendant. While that finding was pending before the court of ap-
peals upon review, the state courts expressly rejected the federal interpretation of state
law that found error in the first trial. Consequently, the court of appeals reinstated the
initial verdict and judgment. Ordinarily, the prior finding of the court of appeals
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might be incapable of declaring state law.6' Uncertainty of state law
should not, by itself, preclude the competence of federal courts to
decide the controversy. 62
Although Judge Brown contended that federal jurisdiction was
not abandoned in Delaney because ihe district court retained juris-
diction over the controversy, once the state court has declared the
law the parties' rights will be established where facts are undis-
puted.63 Moreover, where the facts are disputed, the parties would
have to submit these factual issues to state adjudication in the event
a declaratory judgment or certification procedure is unavailable. In
these situations, diversity jurisdiction might be altogether nullified
by a plea of res judicata upon return to the district court.6 4
would be considered "law of the case" and govern the subsequent disposition of the
controversy. See United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1956). The court of
appeals refused to follow this res judicata principle, however, stating that "this rule is
not an inexorable command, and must not be used to accomplish an obvious in-
justice." 326 F.2d at 276.
61F or example, the cases provided by Judge Brown as examples of erroneous
application of state law did not involve unduly complicated or significant issues.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hallatt, 326 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1964) (whether failure of
insured to attend trial was prejudicial to the insurer); New York Times v. Sullivan,
273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1963) (contra-
vening New York Times v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961)) (whether writing,
editing, printing and distribution of a magazine is only one libel); Food Fair Store,
Inc. v. Trussell, 131 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1961) (contravening Pogue v. Great
Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 242 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1957)) (whether personal injury plaintiff
had to introduce proof that debris on floor of supermarket was present long enough
to be discovered); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Sellbach, 161 Tex. 250, 339 S.W.2d 521 (1960)
(contravening National Surety Corp. v. Bellah, 245 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1957)) (whether
an exception should be imposed upon the rule that a workman's compensation
insurer may not introduce evidence that claimant's disability may be reduced by an
operation).
62Akin v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank, 322 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1963) (status of child
adopted outside the state as forced heir under Louisiana law) is an excellent example
of a federal court unsnarling a complicated area of state law. But cf. ALl, STUDY OF
THE DIvIsION OF JURIsDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1964): "It would be preferable to see the use of the federal courts concentrated upon
the adjudication of rights created by federal substantive law. In such adjudication the
federal courts speak with the authority which they lack in diversity cases since Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and can thus exercise the creative function
which is essential to their dignity and prestige." Id. at 49. (Emphasis added.)
"sThis apparently would have been the case in Delaney.
"The state courts may conclude that the action is barred by res judicata if the
parties seek to relitigate the entire controversy in the state courts. Moreover, although
abstention may be ordered at the district court level, if the parties attempt to obtain
only a determination of the uncertain state law questions by declaratory judgment
or certification, the state courts may decline on the ground that the parties seek an
illegal advisory opinion. See WRIGHT § 52, at 169. Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850, 861-66
(1964) suggests that abstention should be invoked in uncertain state law cases only
after trial of the factual issues in the federal district courts. This approach would in-
sure that the forthcoming state determination was grounded on the established facts of
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A Return to Meredith
Assuming, therefore, that Judge Brown's application of Erie is
an unwarranted extension of the increasing tendency to abstain in
diversity cases, some standards must be reached to determine when
uncertain questions of state law should be remitted to state courts.
Certainly, a primary consideration should be whether an effective
remedy is available to the parties in the state courts. Judge Brown's
statement to the contrary65 was mere dictum, as the parties in Delaney
could have employed a declaratory judgment procedure -in the Texas'
courts.66
Since abstention is a judicially-created encroachment upon the
congressional mandate to decide diversity cases, the doctrine should
be applied only when the advantages to be gained from abstaining
the controversy. The state court's determination of state law may well pose the need
for additional findings of fact, but this problem can be resolved by remanding those
specific questions for new trial. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th
Cir. 1964).
On the other hand, any res judicata question presented to an abstaining federal
court in these circumstances may have been negated by the Supreme Court's decision
in England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). According to Eng-
land, even if the parties were forced to litigate the entire controversy in the state
courts in order to obtain an authoritative determination of state law, their right to
return to the federal forum might be preserved by entering a formal reservation
on the records of the state proceedings. Although England was a federal question
case and involved principles of avoiding a constitutional decision, the language and
philosophy of the majority rationale suggest the holding might be applicable to
diversity actions involving uncertain state law.
"Judge Brown contended that abstention is proper even though an effective
means of determining state law is not readily available to the parties. "If one is not
readily available, then one must either be devised within permissible limits, or the
parties must be left to their own resourceful imaginative devices." 328 F.2d at 488.
Cited as an example of desired ingenuity was City of Meridian v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959). In that case the Supreme Court ordered the
district court to abstain while the parties repaired to the courts of Mississippi, where
no declaratory judgment procedure was available. A state court determination was
obtained only after the two parties switched sides, with the defendant in the federal
action suing the federal plaintiff for non-compliance with the statute which the
latter had alleged was unconstitutional. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of
Meridian, 241 Miss. 678, 131 So. 2d 666 (1961).
Remission under these circumstances may be appropriate where both the parties
are willing to cooperate to enable a state court determination to be rendered. How-
ever, a hostile litigant can sabotage subsequent state court proceedings. Therefore,
it is submitted that in the absence of an agreement between the parties, remission to
the state courts in such cases is unjustifiable. See cases cited note 37 supra. Even though
the federal court retains jurisdiction and can recall the, case if either party becomes
recalcitrant, the opportunity for dilatory maneuvers seems too great. Furthermore,
failure of a party to secure the authoritative state' determination because of lack of a
proper remedy or technical procedural defects should not be deemed as forfeiting
the right of the litigant to return to the federal courts.
"0 328 F.2d at 485. See Tax. Rav. Civ. STAT art. 2524-1 (1951).
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clearly outweigh the delay and expense attendant upon even the most
sophisticated procedural devices available upon remission.07 The
lower federal courts should heed the language of Meredith v. Winter
Haven68 and confine abstention to the exceptional case in which it
is justified by a full consideration of all the relevant factors.
Having ascertained that a state remedy is available, courts should
proceed to determine the magnitude of local concern with the partic-
ular questions presented,6 9 the degree to which determination neces-
sarily involves a fundamental choice between valid conflicting
policies,70 the probability of an erroneous evaluation of state law,7'
the impact of additional delay,72 the ability of the parties to assume
07 For example, there was an interval of approximately one year between certifica-
tion in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) and the return
of the case following state court action in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d
673 (5th Cir. 1963).
08 320 U.S. at 234-35. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
9 A "hierarchy of values" was proposed in Note, 73 YAt L.J. 850, 867 (1964) as
a guide for determining when a given area of state law is sufficiently important to
the state to justify abstention. State constitutional and statutory law would be
given highest priority. State courts would be presumed to be more expert in inter-
preting this body of law than their federal counterparts. State common law would
generally be of less significance; federal competence in this area is probably not
significantly less than that of state tribunals. Nevertheless, it seems readily evident
that any categorical analysis is doomed to failure. The important question is not
the particular variety of state law, but rather its impact upon state policy.
7OThis consideration may be distinguished from the importance of the decision
to the state in that it revolves around the nature of the judicial function. In some
cases more than others, the issues seem to be definable in terms of "pure" policy-
making. Only the courts charged with political responsibility for making such policy
evaluations appear to be able to render meaningful decisions, simply because no
other court possesses the unique sovereign authority to choose between policy altera-
tives. For example, plaintiff brings a diversity action in a federal district court in
state X for wrongful death arising out of an airplane crash in state Y. Plaintiff
claims that under state X choice-of-law rules, the courts of that state would apply
its own wrongful death act. Defendant claims that state X courts would apply state
Y's wrongful death act. There have been no recent decisions on the point by the
state X courts, but the older state X cases hold that the law of the place of injury
[state Y] controls. More recent decisions in other jurisdictions cast doubt on the
continued predominance of the early view. The necessity for this type of policy
determination would seem to call for abstention by the federal district court. See
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 628-29 (1964) and the related case of Griffith v.
United Airlines, 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1964).
"'Questions in this respect would involve the difficulty of the state law issues
presented, the res judicata ramifications of abstention versus federal determination,
and the number and extent of the interests of both sides to the litigation. As an
additional consideration, state courts with crowded dockets may be unwilling to con-
sider the controversy-particularly if the influx of cases is viewed as a shirking of
responsibility by federal courts.
72 "We also cannot ignore that abstention operates to require piecemeal adjudica-
tion in many courts .... thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an
undue length of time .. " Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964). The
examination would include an inquiry into the effect of delay upon the introduction
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the added financial burden, 73 and the importance to the parties
of adjudication by state courts as evidenced by their conduct of the
litigation.74 Under the presumption against abstention espoused in
Meredith, a diversity case should not be remitted unless an applica-
tion of these standards indicate remission is necessary to protect an
important state policy without imposing undue hardship upon the
litigants. 75
According to Meredith, abstention should not be used to en-
croach upon the duty of federal courts to decide diversity cases
except in exceptional circumstances. Thibodaux, Green and De-
laney, however, have obviated the necessity of exceptional circum-
stances both by failing to articulate an evaluation of the above
standards and by failing to weigh them against one another. Un-
fortunately, these precedents may prompt wholesale abnegation of
diversity jurisdiction in cases which might not involve significant
state policies or a substantial risk of error.70 It may be argued that
of necessary evidence and the effectiveness of the relief sought if rendered at some
future date. The Supreme Court has become aware of this latter problem
in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Griffith v. School Rd. of Prince Edward County, 377
U.S. 218, 229 (1964), 1964 DuKE L.J. 155.
7"Corporate and institutional litigants might more readily be expected to bear
the costs of extended litigation than individuals.
74 That a defendant who has removed the controversy from the state courts attaches
little significance to a state determination of uncertain state law questions is prob-
able, but not necessarily true. The defendant may desire access to federal discovery
procedures or prefer federal fact-finding, even though he desires a state court determi-
nation of the relevant law. But see American Universal Ins. Co. v. Chauvin, 829 F.2d
174 (5th Cir. 1964), where the court declined to abstain because the party urging
the lack of clarity of state law had chosen to litigate in the federal forum and had
failed to institute a declaratory judgment proceeding within the state courts. A
motion to stay the district court proceedings pending institution of a suit in the state
courts had been overruled by the district court. The court of appeals concluded that
this factor was of "little significance," since permission from the district court was not
required for institution of a state action. 829 F.2d at 179-80. See also Colbrese v.
National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 978 (D. Mont. 1964).
There the court, after citing Delaney with approval, refused to abstain in a diversity
action involving uncertain state law, stating- "It is difficult to understand why the
defendant has not sought a declaratory judgment from the Supreme Court of
Montana." Id. at 982.
7r The fact that a thorough evaluation requires a balancing of many factors should
not, in and of itself, invest the trial court with discretion or suggest that the trial
court's analysis would be free from appellate review. Note, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 226, 237
n.80 (1959). See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Price, 329 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964);
United States Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 828 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 877
U.S. 985 (1964). The scope of allowable judicial review of the lower court's determina-
tion upon the abstention question, however, should probably be minimized in order
to prevent dilatory maneuvering and consequent delay by frequent reversals of such
orders after the trial court has entered a judgment upon the merits.
7o See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Price, 329 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1964), dis-
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federal courts would be able to manipulate the suggested standards
for purposes of unnecessarily avoiding decision of a state law ques-
tion. Yet it would be anomolous to accord federal courts the duty
of deciding such cases without entrusting them with the discretion
of determining when an application of the above standards truly
poses a case of exceptional circumstances justifying abstention. 70a
FEDERAL QUESTION CASES
In federal question cases, district courts have original jurisdic-
tion of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds ten
thousand dollars and arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States.76b The invocation of abstention to avoid pre-
mature constitutional adjudication77 has persistently posed the prob-
lem of how the parties are to conduct the litigation in state courts. If
either party has failed to exhaust adequate remedies available by
virtue of a state administrative agency, the federal court will dismiss
the action.78 Then the parties must urge and request binding action
cussed in note 60 supra. The sweeping implications of recent decisions may also be
demonstrated by a case in which abstention was invoked for novel and apparently
erroneous reasons. In B-W Acceptance Corp. v. Torgenson, 234 F. Supp. 214 (D.
Mont. 1964), a district court abstained to avoid decision of certain state constitutional
questions. There the defendants contended that provisions of the Montana Retail
Sales Installment Act permitting interest rates in excess of 10% were repugnant to
the Montana constitution. The use of abstention to avoid a constitutional question
has previously been invoked only in cases involving questions under the federal
constitution. Furthermore, the court did not evaluate factors justifying remission In
cases involving uncertain state law.
761"The abstention doctrine is not an automatic rule applied whenever a federal
court is faced with a doubtful issue of State law; it rather involves a discretionary
exercise of a court's equity powers. Ascertainment of whether there exist the 'special
circumstances,' . . . prerequisite to its application must be made on a case-by-case
basis." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964) (White, J.).
7b28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
7 See notes 8-9 supra.
78E.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Embassy Pictures Corp. v.
Hudson, 226 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Tenn. 1964). See also Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 n.2 (1964) (approving district court's refusal to abstain be-
cause the parties lacked "an adequate, speedy and complete remedy" in the state
courts); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 675-76 (1963) (exhaustion of avail-
able administrative remedy. not required if obviously ineffective).
Federal determination of the case is regarded as anathema, because a forthcoming
federal decision reviewing the disposition of a controversy before administra-
tive remedies are exhausted may disrupt the regulatory scheme of a state and generate
federal-state friction. Abstention by a federal district court is justified because: (1)
respect for the administrative process dictates that it should be allowed to culminate
before outside intervention; (2) the likelihood that an eventual disruption will occur
is diminished because of the high attrition rate upon the road to Supreme Court
review.
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upon both state and federal issues on the state level.7 9 A different
situation is presented where administrative primacy in not involved
and an abstaining federal court retains jurisdiction over the con-
troversy. In a few such instances, only specific issues of state law have
been remitted for determination."0 Usually, however, abstaining
courts have couched their orders of remission in general terms, stat-
ing only that the parties are to repair to the state courts for determi-
nation of state law.81
State Court Consideration of the Federal Question
In the latter situation, the remitted parties are faced with the
problem of obtaining the necessary state law determination while
preserving their right to return to the federal courts against a claim
of res judicata.8 2 Compounding their difficulties in this respect has
been the Supreme Court's enigmatic holding in Government Em-
ployees v. Windsor83 that a litigant remitted to the state courts via
Thus, abstention appears to be mandatory if "a federal decision would work
disruption of an entire legislative scheme of regulation." Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964) (distric: court did not err in refusing
to abstain where there was no danger of disrupting state regulatory scheme); Ala-
bama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951). But see Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., supra, which suggests that a federal district court has discretion as to
whether to abstain.
70 See Note, 59 COLUm. L. REv. 749, 775 (1959); Note, 73 HARv. L. Rv. 1358, 1362
(1959).
8oSee Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 (1957). Note, 59 COLUM.
L. R v. 749, 775 (1959), suggests that the case may represent a special solicitude for
the rights of the United States to a federal forum.
8 In most cases the parties have submitted the entire controversy to the state
courts and there sought relief on claims under both state and federal law.
"12See REsTATEmENT, JumDMNTs § 63, comment a (1942). Ordinarily the doctrine
of res judicata would bar relitigation of federal questions that might have been
litigated before the state courts.
8-353 U.S. 364 (1957). The Windsor litigation has been aptly characterized as
"an amazing odyssey possible only in our federal system." Note, 73 HARv. L. REv.
1358, 1363 (1960). The federal district court in which suit was filed abstained, and
the Supreme Court affirmed the abstention order. 347 U.S. 901 (1954), affirming
per curiam 116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953). Plaintiffs then entered the state courts,
making timely arguments only as to the applicability of the state statutes which
they had previously attempted to attack in the federal courts on Constitutional
grounds. The Alabama supreme court ruled against the plaintiffs on the state law
issue, but did not render judgment on the federal questions. 262 Ala. 285, 286, 78
So. 2d 646, 647 (1955). Plaintiffs then returned to the federal district court, which
held the statute constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs. 146 F. Supp. 214 (N.D.
Ala. 1956). The Supreme Court. reversed the federal district court, reasoning that
the state court's decision was only a "bare adjudication," not authoritative on the
questions of state law, because the plaintiffs had not given the state courts the
opportunity to construe state law in the light of their federal constitutional objec-
tions. 353 U.S. 364 (1957) (per curiam). The plaintiffs reentered the state courts,
but the suit was dismissed on the grounds that a justiciable controversy had not been
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abstention must afford the state courts the opportunity to construe
state law "in light of the [federal] constitutional objections presented
to the district court."8' 4 Where the state court is not given this
opportunity, its decision upon state law is only a "bare adjudica-
tion" which affords an insufficient basis for federal disposition of
the case. The vexing aspect of the Windsor holding was the Court's
failure to prescribe the steps to be taken at the state level to insure
that issues of state law are placed in the required constitutional
perspective.
According to one view, nothing less than seeking complete ad-
judication of both state and federal questions would meet the
Windsor requirements. 85 However, if a party sought and received
binding relief on his federal question in the state courts, res judicata
might bar his return to the abstaining federal court with regard to
the federal question. Consequently, the statutory right to litigate
federal questions in a federal forum would be substantially ab-
rogated. Supreme Court review of an adverse state court determi-
nation of federal questions, while still available,80 ordinarily is an
inadequate substitute for initial federal determination. 7 As a
general rule, the Supreme Court considers itself bound to ac-
cept state determinations of factual issues.8 8 Since federal claims
demonstrated by the pleadings. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Em-
ployees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala. 13, 104 So. 2d 827 (1958).' Plaintiffs sought federal
adjudication once more, but were told to reframe their state pleadings. Government
& Civic Emplyees Organizing Committee v. Windsor, Civil No. 7466, N.D. Ala., Dec.
24, 1958. See Note, 73 HARv. L. Rlv. 1358, 1363 n.38 (1960). At this point the weary
plaintiffs capitulated. See also Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951), a suit that lasted nine years and went through eight courts before the
plaintiff obtained a ruling of unconstitutionality of a state statute.
84353 U.S. at 366.
8See Note, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 773 (1959). A different view was expressed
in Note, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 1358, 1360-61 (1960). There it was contended that the
state courts need only decide the state law issues. The parties might even be en-
joined from presenting their federal questions to the state courts for adjudication
and any forthcoming state court determination of the federal questions would be
denied res judicata status by the federal courts.
"Prerequisites for Supreme Court review include the following: (1) a final decree
or judgment; (2) a determination by the highest court in the state in which a de-
cision might be had; (3) the existence of a substantial federal question; (4) a federal
question that has been properly raised and reserved as required by state practice;
(5) the absence of an independent, non-federal basis which supports the state court's
judgment. Wiener, Wanna Make a Federal Case Out of It?, 48 A.B.A.J. 59 (1962).
See note 91 infra.
8T England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
See also Brennan, State Court Decisions and the Supreme Court, 31 PA. B.A.J. 393,
398 (1960); note 120 infra.
88 See 64 COLUM. L. Rv. 766, 770 n.47 (1964) (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
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often turn upon these findings, 89 the impartiality and special com-
petence of federal district courts to decide federal questions is the
reason these courts are granted jurisdiction to entertain constitu-
tional questions.90 Moreover, since the extent of Supreme Court
review may rest in the Court's discretion, 9' the scope of argument
may be more restricted than it would be in lower courts. 92 Thus it
is possible that complete adjudication of the federal constitutional
question in state courts may deprive the parties of a comprehensive
consideration of the federal right in a federal court.
The Parties' Option
In the recent case of England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners93 the Supreme Court refused to allow Windsor to under-
mine federal jurisdiction in this manner. In England several chiro-
practors asserted that the educational requirements of the Louisiana
Medical Practice Act had been applied to them in violation of the
261, 296 (1947)). But cf. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-19 (1963) (federal
courts are not prevented from going beyond the state records in habeas corpus
proceedings).
8"1"How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of federal claims."
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964). See
also Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958).
00 See Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REv. 213,
217 (1959).
91 Review may be by way of discretionary writ of certorari where a state court
sustains an attack upon a state statute as repugnant to the United States Constitution,
28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1958), or by appeal as a matter of right if the state court
upholds the state law as Constitutional, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1958). In Tribune
Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 120 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Pa. 1954), the district
court abstained in a case involving the Constitutionality of a county court rule pro-
hibiting the taking of photographs in court during court proceedings. The highest
state court passed upon both the state and federal questions and the Supreme Court
denied certorari. In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
1002 (1957). The plaintiff returned to the district court, which held that res judicata
did not prevent presentation of the federal questions. The court of appeals affirmed.
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1957), aff'd,
254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958). Note, 73 HAitv. L. REv. 1358, 1366, argues that the sole
basis for this decision is the view that the Supreme Court's consideration of a
petition for certorari is insufficient protection of the litigant's right to a federal
forum on federal questions. Furthermore, the argument is advanced that the dis-
missal of an appeal for want of a substantial federal question or a summary affirm-
ance affords no sufficiently greater protection. "[I]n view of the small amount of
time which the Court has to consider each appeal, it seems unrealistic to hold that
federal claims are barred by a disposition on appeal without full argument." Id. at
1367.
02 See note 91 supra. Supreme Court rules limit the duration of oral argument.
U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 44.
- 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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fourteenth amendment. There a three-judge district court was con-
vened on remand94 from the Fifth Circuit and abstained, sua
sponte,95 on the ground that the state courts might find that the
statute did not apply to the plaintiffs98 No appeal was taken from
the abstention order.97 Thereafter the plaintiffs were denied relief
in the state courts on both their state and federal questions.98 When
they attempted to return to the abstaining district court,99 plaintiffs
were met with a successful plea of res judicata since the state courts
had passed upon federal issues.100 Pursuant to statute,10 1 plaintiffs ap-
pealed directly to the Supreme Court.
The decision was reversed by the Court'02 on the basis of the
9,259 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1958), petition for rehearing denied, 263 F.2d 661, cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959).
"The Supreme Court has frequently invoked abstention sua sponte. See City of
Meredian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959); Albertson v. Millard,
345 U.S. 242 (1953); Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 (1942).
:0 180 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. La. 1960).
SThe plaintiffs did not appeal the district court's order of abstention, nor did
they challenge it before the Supreme Court. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 413 n.2 (1964). The Court did not consider the
validity of abstention under the circumstances, and it may well be argued that
abstention was inappropriate. The Louisiana courts had long ago determined the
applicability of the State Medical Practice Act to chiropractors, Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58, aJ'd, 274 U.S. 720 (1927), but
the federal district court held the state courts should have the opportunity to re-
examine their position in light of modern medical developments. The federal district
court did not elaborate, however, regarding the question of whether new medical
knowledge existed which would indicate that chiropractic should be entitled to
greater recognition than in the past.
Furthermore, the fact that the state legislature had for a considerable length of
time acquiesced in the earlier decision would seem to indicate that the prior determi-
nation was a proper interpretation of the state statute. See also Selden v. Boone, 221
F. Supp. 845 (D. Del. 1963) (abstention held improper in action to compel issuance
of license to practice dentistry premised on Civil Rights Act).
98 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 126 So. 2d 51 (Ct. App.
La. 1960), aff'd, 130 So. 2d 671 (La. 1961). The Louisiana Court of Appeals stated
that "[I]n the case of Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Beatty, 220 La.
1, 55 So. 2d 761, the Supreme Court of this state had before it the resolution of
every contention made by the plaintiffs herein and that court determined adversely
the contentions herein." Id. at 53. The court did agree, however, that whether
chiropractry is a "useful profession" and entitled to recognition is "primarily a ques-
tion of fact." The parties had submitted affidavits debating this question at the trial
level and the trial court found adversely to the plaintiffs. Id. at 56.
9 The plaintiffs did not attempt to obtain appellate review of the state court
decision. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 414
n.4 (1964).
200 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.
La. 1961).
-028 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958).
102 Mr. Justice Black would have dismissed the action for want of a substantial
federal question. Id. at 437.
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plaintiffs' good-faith reliance on a reasonable misinterpretation of
Windsor.10 3 In establishing a standard for future cases, the Court
held that Windsor did not require a remitted litigant to seek final
adjudication of his federal claims in the state court, but required
him only to "inform" the latter of the existence and nature of his
federal constitutional questions. 10 4 This would enable him to avoid
an anomalous application of res judicata that would bar subsequent
federal adjudication of his federal claims.10 5 Recognizing the difficul-
ty of resisting argument of federal claims and the virtual impossibili-
ty of preventing a state court from deciding a federal question if it
were so inclined,10 6 the Court held that a litigant's right to return
"will in all events be preserved' 07 if he makes a formal reservation
on the state record of his right to return to federal court for adjudi-
cation of his federal claims. 08 In the absence of a formal reservation,
a plaintiff would be entitled to return if he had not fully litigated
his federal question in the state court.
The England decision complements the earlier decision of the
Court in NAACP v. Button,0 9 holding that a party remitted to the
state courts by abstention might there elect to litigate all his claims
fully and without reservation, thus foregoing his prerogative to re-
turn to a federal district court which had retained jurisdiction." 0
Many times a litigant might wish to follow this course in order to
avoid the delay and expense attendant upon return to the federal
forum."'1
The net result of England and Button is to make three alterna-
tive courses of action available to a litigant remitted to the state
courts by abstention. He may (1) seek final adjudication of all his
claims, both state and federal, in the state courts; (2) explicitly
103 375 U.S. at 422-23.
,
10 
.Id. at 420.
205 Id. at 421-22.
200Id. at 421.
"' Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
110 Id. at 419, 421-22.
1"-371 U.S. 415 (1963).
11 In Button the Court held that retention of jurisdiction by the abstaining
federal district court was "purely formal" and did not prevent the state court de-
cision from meeting the requirements of finality. Id. at 427-28.
11 375 U.S. at 419. But see Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1358, 1365, nA8 (1960): "[I]t
seems inequitable to allow the plaintiff to make his choice of forum more than
once during the course of the litigation; if, as seems unlikely, he desired to have
the state courts decide his federal claims, he should either have dismissed his federal-
court suit and begun anew in the state courts, or should have brought suit in the
state courts in the first place."
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reserve his right to return to the federal courts for adjudication of
his federal questions; or (3) proceed in the state courts without
revealing which course he is following, neither formally reserving
his federal claims nor requesting binding adjudication thereof in
the state courts.
(1) Final Adjudication in the State Courts.
The possibility of advantage to a plaintiff in seeking final adjudi-
cation of all claims in the state courts was vitiated by dictum in
England. There the majority stated that despite a plaintiff's elec-
tion to litigate fully in the state courts, the defendant may reserve
the right to return to federal court by virtue of his removal power.11 2
The majority did not require the defendant to exercise his removal
power early in the trial in order to enter an appropriate reserva-
tion, 1 3 but stated that the mere refusal to oppose the federal claim
was sufficient reservation."14 Thus, if the defendant can compel re-
litigation of the issues in a federal court, the plaintiff will be unable
to obtain a "final" state court adjudication against the defendant's
will."15
11228 U.S.C. § 1441 (b) (1958). "The reservation may be made by either party to
the litigation. Usually the plaintiff will have made the original choice to litigate in
the federal court, but the defendant also, by virtue of the removal jurisdiction . . .
has a right to litigate the federal question there. . . . Thus, while a plaintiff who
unreservedly litigates his federal claims in the state courts may thereby elect to
forego his own right to return to the District Court, he cannot impair the correspond-
ing right of the defendant. The latter may protect his right by either declining to
oppose the plaintiff's federal claim in the state court or opposing it with the appro-
priate reservation." (Emphasis added.) 375 U.S. 411, 422 at n.13.
113 Under the removal statute, the defendant must file a petition for removal
within twenty days after he is served with notice of the plaintiff's suit. 28 U.S.C. §
1446 (b).
""4 See quotation, note 112 supra.
115 England fails to indicate whether a decision adverse to the non-reserving party
would be "final" and reviewable by the Supreme Court when the opposing party
has preserved his right to return to the federal district court. It has been held that
a judgment which leaves open the possibility of additional proceedings which may
raise other federal questions is not "final" for the purpose of Supreme Court review.
Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (1948). However, if this rule
were extended by analogy to cases such as England, a party submitting adjudication
of his federal claims to a state court might be totally deprived of access to a federal
forum. On the other hand, if such decisions are regarded as "final" and are actually
reviewed by the Supreme Court, the principle of "law of the case" may pose other
difficulties. See 5 Am. JuR. 2D Appeal & Error § 744 (1962) and cases cited therein. "Law
of the case" prevents reconsideration of issues of law which have been raised or decided,
or could have been raised, on prior appeal in the same action. Thus, subsequent action
by a federal district court which had retained jurisdiction would be controlled as to
matters of law by the review obtained by the non-reserving party. However, the federal
district court could avoid subjection to the former Supreme Court holding by basing a
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In the absence of a specific requirement that the defendant re-
serve his federal questions at the commencement of state court litiga-
tion, it would seem that the defendant is presented with a double
opportunity to win the case. Although the plaintiff who elects to
present his federal claim would be bound by a state court adjudi-
cation thereof, the defendant, by refusing to oppose the argument,
could exercise his removal power at the termination of unfavorable
litigation. Whether the defendant's legitimate interest in a federal
forum warrants a delayed removal power is questionable. Under
present law a defendant may remove to a federal court only when
the plaintiff has asserted a valid federal claim on the face of his
complaint;- 6 if the federal question is raised by way of defense,
there is no basis for removal." 7 Some commentators argue that this
situation is exactly the opposite of what should be the case.118 Since
the only reason for removal in many cases is the fear that federal
claims may be treated "ungenerously" by state courts," 9 if the
plaintiff is willing to submit determination of his claim to a state
court, it seems anomalous to accord the defendant the right to re-
move. This would seem particularly true if, as England suggests,
the defendant is accorded a double opportunity to try the facts of
his case.
(2) The Formal Reservation
Even if defendant does not reserve the right to return to federal
court, the formal reservation procedure outlined in England pre-
sents difficult questions as applied to plaintiffs. 20 Mr. Justice Doug-
variant ruling of law on facts different from those established in the records of the state
court proceedings. See Id. § 748. This result would create additional problems. Since
the state court determination of state law would be based upon a set of facts differ-
ent from those established by the federal tribunal, it is not clear whether the state
court decision would be regarded as "authoritative" as to the matters of uncertain
state law of which clarification was sought by abstention. Consequently, contradictory
findings of fact might be deemed to require another order of abstention by the
federal district court. Cf. 64 COLUmn. L. Rgv. 766, 773 (1964). This unhappy eventuality
could be avoided by the federal district court making findings of fact prior to the
initial abstention.
1L See Wucrr, FEDr-RAL CouRTs § 38, at 110 (1963).
"I Id. at 111.
"' See, e.g., Wechsler, Federal jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 233-34 (1948).
120 Id. at 234. Another justification for removal is grounded in convenience for the
out-of-state defendant.
110 England leaves in doubt the current status of Lassiter v. Northampton County
Bd. of Elections, 860 U.S. 45, 50 (1959). There the North Carolina Supreme Court
passed upon both the state law questions and the federal constitutional validity of
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las in a concurring opinion stated that the formal reservation pro-
cedure is an unnecessary trap for the unwary, in that it establishes
an "exotic rule of federal procedure" with which most attorneys
will not be familiar.11' He suggested, therefore, that res judicata
should not bar a party from returning to federal court unless that
party has "elected" state court adjudication by a request for Supreme
Court review of a state decision; 122 until that step is taken, "he is
only doing what he is required to do"'123 by virtue of abstention.
Another objection is that the procedure may prove unworkable
in certain cases. 124 State courts may be reluctant to decide cases in
piecemeal fashion by ruling only on state law questions, or they may
conclude that they are being asked to render a forbidden advisory
opinion.125
the state statute on its face. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C.
102, 102 S.E.2d 853 (1958). The plaintiff appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
Defendants there contended that since the federal district court had retained jurisdiction
over the federal issues, the state court's decision upon those questions represented
mere dictum. The Supreme Court held that the state court properly passed upon
the validity of a state statute upon its face, and indicated that the plaintiff could
return to the federal district court to attack the application of the state statutes. See
Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226, 238 (1959).
No clarification is made in England as to whether a litigant may reserve a right
to return to an abstaining federal district court when his federal question concerns
only the validity of a state statute upon its face, or whether it is necessary for him to
enter a formal reservation of his right to return to the federal district court when he
challenges the constitutionality of a state's status as applied. Mr. Justice Brennan's
opinion makes no explicit distinction between invalid-on-face and invalid-as-applied ob-
jections, thus indicating that both situations will be treated alike and the Lassiter dis-
tinction vitiated. However, Brennan also stated that "in cases where, but for the
application of the abstention doctrine, the primary fact determination would have
been by the District Court, a litigant may not be unwillingly deprived of that determi-
nation." 375 U.S. at 417. (Emphasis added.) This language may serve merely to
distinguish the types of cases subject to the England rule from those involving the
primacy of state regulatory agencies, since England is inapplicable to the Burford
line of decisions. See note 78 supra.
121 "Those who read this opinion may have adequate warning. But this opinion,
like most, will become an obscure one-little known to the Bar. Lawyers do not
keep up with all the nuances of court opinions, especially those touching on as exotic
a rule of federal procedure as the one we evolve today. I fear therefore that the
rule we announce today will be a veritable trap." Id. at 435.
222 375 U.S. at 429.
123 Ibid.
12, An example of the weaknesses in the England approach may be presented when
a plaintiff brings suit in a state court and the defendant removes to a federal dis-
trict court which abstains. Under these circumstances there seems to be no legitimate
reason for allowing the plaintiff to reserve the right to return to the federal tribunal,
since he has previously indicated a preference for a state court adjudication of his
federal claims. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of North Kansas City, 276 F.2d 932
(8th Cir. 1960) (fact that defendant procured removal from state court does not bar
invocation of abstention).
12 WRIGHT, FEDRAL. CouRTs § 52 at 171 (1963): "Many states are likely to think,
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Even if state courts determine they are able to decide only state
law issues, it can be contended that formal reservation does not in-
sure a meaningful rendition of state law. The primary reason for
Windsor's requirement that state courts must be apprised of federal
questions in a remitted case is that a state court may take greater lib-
erties in construing a statute to preserve its constitutionality. 126 It
might be argued that if the plaintiff enters a formal reservation, a
state court need not decide the federal question; thus it might feel no
compulsion to undertake a saving construction of state law, and state
statutes might become increasingly vulnerable to constitutional at-
tack. Nevertheless, the responsibility of state courts to perpetuate
state policy would seem to be sufficient motivation to construe state
law in a liberal and saving manner. When state courts are apprised of
the federal question,127 this responsibility remains even though the
plaintiff has the power to transfer ultimate responsibility for de-
cision to the federal judiciary.
(3) The Ambivalent Course of Action
Another complication under England is presented when the
plaintiff elects to proceed in the state courts without entering a
formal reservation of his right to return to a federal forum, and
yet seeks to preserve that right by minimal compliance with the re-
quirements of Windsor.128 So long as the litigant merely "informs"
the state court of his federal questions, his right to return is pro-
tected. Nevertheless, once a party undertakes to do more than "in-
form" the state court, England suggests that he may be deemed to
however, that the decision of only a fragment of a case, with the ultimate power to
give judgment left to the federal court, is an advisory opinion beyond their power
to render." See Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d
845 (1961) which seems to support the view expressed in Note, 73 HAiv. L. Rv.
1358, 1361 (1960), that the state courts will in all probability respect the wishes of
the federal courts in such cases and decide only the state law issues. If the state
courts refuse to pass upon the federal questions urged, presumably a party may
return to the federal forum to litigate those issues even where he has fully litigated
his federal questions in the state courts.
1
"But cf. Guy v. Rolvaag, 233 F. Supp. 301 (D. Minn. 1964); Telephone News
Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ill. 1963) where the federal
district court construed a previously unconstrued state statute and upheld its validity
under the federal constitution. See also Baggett v. Bullit, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), which
held abstention improper where an unconstrued state statute requiring loyalty oaths
from teachers and state employees was void for vagueness and could not possibly
be preserved by a saving construction by the state courts.
2 375 U.S. at 421.
128 Ibid.
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have elected in favor of final state court adjudication.129  Attempt-
ing to hedge, therefore, would be extremely dangerous. The Court
in England did not specify what actions would exceed the bounds
of "information," and a party might be hard pressed to say with
certainty that he had complied with England and Windsor.
Nevertheless, in certain cases a party who is uncertain about
pressing his federal claim in the state court might find it advan-
tageous to avoid a specific reservation which at the outset would
commit him to return to the federal courts. He might be able to
forestall an election so long as the applicable state procedure pro-
vides an opportunity to initiate a new theory of relief based on a
.federal question. Conversely, if, as England suggests, mere "argu-
ment" of a federal claim is an election in favor of final state court
adjudication, a party who anticipates favorable state court adjudica-
tion of federal questions may be able to finalize the forthcoming
decision by launching an eleventh-hour "argument"'130 of those ques-
tions and seeking binding relief in state appellate proceedings.
Clearly, however, the Court intended that reservation by a refusal
to argue was necessary only to protect the remitted plaintiff who
has inadvertently failed to enter a formal reservation.' 81 The pro-
cedural antics mentioned above might be precluded if this alterna-
tive method of reserving the right to return to federal court were
conditioned on a good faith error in failing to formally reserve a
return to federal courts.
CONCLUSION
The sweeping encroachment upon federal jurisdiction advocated
by Judge Brown in Delaney would appear to be totally unjustified. 8 2
129 375 U.S. at 418-19.
2190 But cf. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Dawkins,
268 Ala. 13, 104 So. 2d 827 (1958). There plaintiff argued his federal constitutional
questions on appeal after urging only the non-applicability of the state statute before
the trial court. The state supreme court failed to pass on the federal questions
and the Supreme Court subsequently held the state decision a "bare adjudication"
not authoritative upon the state law questions, since the state courts were not given
a sufficient opportunity to determine the state law issues in light of plaintiff's federal
constitutional objections. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. V. Wind-
sor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
"'
9 This was apparently the majority's solution to the problem posed by Mr.
Justice Douglas. See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
192 Constriction of diversity jurisdiction is a matter properly left in the hands of Con-
gress. A recent study of the American Law Institute concludes that federal diversity
jurisdiction is unwarranted "when a person's involvement with a state is such as to
eliminate any real risk of prejudice against him as a stranger and make it unreason-
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It is true that determination of questions of uncertain state law
might result in erroneous decisions, and federal courts may some-
times face the unpleasant task of conceding the "error" of their
previous interpretation. 33 Nevertheless, the parties have had their
day in court,13 4 and their dispute has been settled by the rule of
law. The risk of erroneous interpretation is but one factor which
federal courts should consider in determining whether a court is
justified in imposing the disadvantages of abstention upon the
parties.
In those cases where abstention is ordered to avoid unnecessary
decision of. a federal constitutional question, the doctrine would be
better served by modifying the position advanced in England. The
defendant's removal power should be limited to express reservations
at the initiation of suit in the state court. Furthermore, Mr. Justice
Douglas' suggestion that only a request for Supreme Court review
should be deemed an election in favor of "final" state court adjudi-
cation of federal questions would avoid most of the procedural en-
tanglements suggested by the majority opinion.135
g.t.n.
able to need any objections he might make to the quality of its judicial system ......
ALI, STuDy OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS at
2 (Tent. Draft. No. 2, 1964). The Institute proposes, therefore, to forbid diversity
to be invoked (1) by a plaintiff in his home state; (2) by a "foreign" corporation
in the state of a "local establishment"--when the action involves activities of the
latter; (3) by a natural persofi in the state in which he has his principle place of
business or employment; (4) by an out-of-state fiduciary in the state of the decedent
or ward. Id. at 2-5.
155 Note, 73 YALE L.J. 850 (1964) observes that the existence of a single federal
precedent upon a matter of uncertain state law may be of benefit to the state courts,
by acting as a gadfly. The federal determination may provoke learned commentary
and provide working experience with a particular rule. The state courts then have
the advantage of a trial balloon, without paying the price of a stare decisis determina-
tion.
'1, See note 57 supra.
111 It is arguable that this method would afford the plaintiff a double opportunity
to triumph by fully litigating in the state courts and then returning to the federal
forum should he be unsuccessful. However, the likelihood that state courts will treat
the plaintiff's claim with undue generosity seems particularly remote. If the plaintiff
is able to prevail on constitutional challenges to state legislation at the state level,
it is extremely probable that he would also prevail in a federal court.
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